Informational asymmetries have long been recognized as one of the causes of wasteful conflicts. Signaling has been found to be an effective tool for interested parties to truthfully communicate private information. Can signaling help reduce the risk of conflict? I study this question in a model in which a Sender sends a signal about his privately known cost of conflict, a Receiver makes an offer, and the Sender decides whether or not to start a conflict. I find that when the outcomes of a conflict do not depend on previous actions such as wars where the winner gains the disputed territory, signaling does not permit any information transmission.
From wars to trials via strikes, conflicts occur various forms despite their cost and the risk they involve all interested parties. This puzzle has led a large literature to investigate the sources of a conflict. One commonly recognized cause is informational asymmetry. But are these informational asymmetries inescapable? Are there means to eliminate them?
In this paper, I consider one potential decentralized mechanism to reduce asymmetry of information: costly signaling. I find that signaling facilitates information transmission only under restrictive conditions on the form of conflict and distribution of private information. Importantly, wars, as they are usually modeled, do not meet these conditions. Signaling never allows for any information transmission prior to military action: the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.
These results contrast with dozens of studies which find that signaling helps information transmission even when players have strong incentives to misrepresent themselves. They, however, can be explained by a single factor: the shadow of conflict.
Formally, I build upon bargaining models of war. A Sender has private information about his cost of conflict, whereas the Receiver's cost is commonly known. In a first stage, the Sender can send a signal at a cost satisfying increasing differences (i.a., increasing his signal becomes more costly as the Sender's cost of conflict increases). After observing the Sender's signal, a Receiver makes an to the Sender. The latter then decides whether to start a conflict. A conflict takes the form of a lottery over various potential outcomes.
In the paper, I distinguish between two different forms of lottery: fixed-outcome and offerdependent lotteries. In fixed-outcome lotteries, the possible outcomes of the conflict do not depend on the Receiver's offer. This corresponds to several well-known situations. Armed conflicts are usually modeled as winner-takes-all lotteries in which the payoff from victory does not depend on a country's prior concessions (Ramsay, 2017) . Signaling here assumes the form of staging military parade, missile tests, demonstrations, or protestations at the United Nation organization. This representation of conflicts also applies to trials as plea bargain offers do not constraint future legal proceedings (Silveira, 2017) . Here, delaying tactics can be thought as signals. Another possible example is strikes whose successes or failures have little to do with the wage offer prior to collective action and for which trade unions can use tracts and posters to signal their ability to mobilize their members. In turn, in offer-dependent lotteries, one or more possible outcomes strictly increases with the Receiver's offer. This type of conflict is less common, but not unknown. Wolton (2017) models outside lobbying activities as an offer-dependent lottery (the Receiver's offer is a bill which is either enacted or abandoned) with informative lobbying and contributions serving as signals.
The form of conflict plays a critical role for information transmission. If the conflict is a fixedoutcome lottery, then the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. To understand this result, suppose that the Sender's cost can take only two values: high or low. If the Sender were to reveal his cost, the Receiver would make a compromise offer which leaves the Sender indifferent between starting a conflict and accepting the offer (any other offer, I show, is dominated). Now suppose that a low-cost Sender pretends to be a high-type Sender. The Receiver's offer is then less attractive than the compromise offer for a low-cost, and the Sender starts a conflict. Because the conflict is a fixed-outcome lottery, a low-cost Sender's expected payoff from imitating a high-cost is exactly the same as his payoff from revealing his type: the expected payoff from a conflict. A low-cost Sender has thus no gain from differentiating himself from a high type and is not willing to pay any signaling cost. Let us now turn to a high-cost Sender. If he pretends to be a low-cost, he obtains a compromise offer which makes the low-cost Sender indifferent between conflict and peace. This is always more attractive that the compromise offer he obtains from truthfully revealing his type.
In other words, a high-cost Sender has a positive benefit from imitating a low-cost Sender and the signaling cost must be positive to avoid him mimicking a low type. Of course, the two conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and information transmission is impossible. The reasoning above applies to all informative equilibria for all possible fixed-outcome lotteries, all (additively separable) continuous utility functions, and all distribution of the Sender's costs. In all cases, there is no information transmission in equilibrium.
When the conflict takes the form of an offer-dependent lottery, a low-cost Sender gets some benefit from differentiation since the outcome of the conflict depends on the offer on the table to begin with. Because of the possibility of conflict, however, a low-cost Sender's benefit from differentiation is strictly lower than a high-cost Sender's benefit from imitation. A low-cost Sender then is only willing to send a relatively low costly signal to reveal his type. For separation to occur, it must be that even this relatively low signal is too expensive for a high-cost Sender. This is possible only if the two types are sufficiently apart (taking advantage of the increasing difference in signaling costs). The reasoning above thus implies that a separating equilibrium never exists when the set of possible Sender's cost contains an interval (as types are too close) and exists only under restrictive conditions when the Sender's costs take discrete values. While information transmission is possible with offer-dependent lottery, it does not occur generically.
A large literature studies the relationship between uncertainty and conflict (for two excellent recent reviews, see Sjöström, 2013 and Ramsay, 2017) . Few papers, however, consider whether signaling can alleviate informational asymmetries and reduce the risk of conflict. Baliga and Sjöström (2004) and Kydd (2005) show how cheap talk can be effective in term of reducing the risk of arm races. However, their results rely on arm races being a form of prisoner's dilemma and thus players having some commonality of interest. This is not the case in bargaining model of war. In such context, my paper extends the signaling analysis in Arena (2013) . While Arena considers a single utility function (linear), single lottery (winner-takes-all), and binary signals, I look at the effectiveness of signaling for all continuous utility functions, all lotteries, and all possible signals. Finally, my finding can be related to recent works on mediation (Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani, 2015; Meirowitz et al., 2017) . These papers show that in the optimal mediation equilibrium, the probability of war is strictly positive to induce participants to truthfully reveal their private information. In turn, I establish that there is no decentralized mechanism which guarantees information revelation because of the shadow of war.
1 Set-up I study a one-period game with a Sender (S) and a Receiver (R). The receiver makes an offer a R ∈ [a, a], with (without loss of generality) 0 ≤ a < a. Depending on contexts, the offer is a division of a disputed territory, a plea bargain offer, a wage rise, or the content of a bill. After observing a R , the Sender can decide whether to start a conflict: f S ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 denoting conflict. The conflict corresponds to a war, going to trial, going on strike, or outside lobbying activities. A conflict has two consequences. First, a conflict affects the outcome of the game, denoted z: no conflict leads to outcome z = a R with probability 1, whereas conflict generates a lottery L(a R ) over possible outcomes. Second, a conflict imposes a cost on both players. I describe these two aspects in turn.
Denote z(a R ) = {z 1 (a R ), . . . , z N (a R )} ∈ [a, a] N , N ≥ 2, the set of possible outcomes in a conflict (f S = 1) with z j (·) < z j+1 (·) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N −1}. Denote as well p = {p 1 , . . . , p N } ∈ ∆(z(a R )) the associated probability distribution over outcomes (i.e., P r(z = z j (·)) = p j for all j). The lottery L can be represented as L(a R ) =< z(a R ), p >. Throughout, I suppose that L(·) is non-degenerate (i.e., there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , N } such that p j ∈ (0, 1)). I distinguish between a fixed-outcome lottery in which z j (a R ) is constant in a R for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N } and an offer-dependent lottery in which there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , N } such as z j (a R ) is strictly increasing in a R . A commonly used fixed-outcome lottery in the literature is the winner-takes-all lottery: z(a R ) = {a, a} and p = {p, 1 − p} for all a R ∈ [a, a]. An example of offer-dependent lottery is z = {a, a R } and p = {p, 1 − p} so that the Receiver either obtains a or his offer a R .
The cost of conflict for the Receiver is common knowledge and equals k R > 0. The cost for the Sender is his private information (type) and denoted k S . Types are drawn from a commonly known type space K S ⊆ [k S , k S ] with 0 < k S < k S according to the common knowledge cumulative distribution function F (·). Throughout, I assume that F (·) is non-degenerate and without loss of generality k S , k S ∈ K 2 S . Note that K S can be an interval (i.e., F (·) is continuous) or a discrete set (i.e., F (·) exhibits discontinuities). At the beginning of the game, the Sender can send a signal s S ∈ R + to reveal his type. The cost of signal s S is C(s S , k S ). I assume that C(·, k S ) is strictly increasing in s S with lim
Turning to payoffs, the Receiver, without loss of generality, prefers higher outcome z. Her utility can be represented as:
In turn, the Sender prefers lower outcome and his utility assumes the following form:
I impose that both r(·) and v(·) are bounded, and strictly increasing over [a, a] . Further, I assume that v(·) is C 1 over [a, a] (the reasoning can be extended to a semi-continuous v(·) or v ′ (·) at the cost of complicating the analysis). Observe that the model allows for players to be risk-seeking on some subset of [a, a] (i.e., r(·) convex and/or v(·) concave).
To summarize, the game proceeds as follows:
0. Nature draws k S from K S according to the distribution F (·);
1. Sender privately observes k S and sends signal s S ≥ 0;
2. Receiver observes s S and chooses a R ∈ [a, a];
3. Sender chooses f S ∈ {0, 1}; 4. Nature determines outcome, the game ends, and payoffs are realized.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilbrium (henceforth 'equilibrium'). Observe that I do not impose any equilibrium refinement (e.g., Intuitive Criterion). This means that out-ofequilibrium beliefs are unrestricted to facilitate information transmission. I also assume that the cost of signaling C(·, ·) is C 1 and exhibits strict increasing differences. That is, for all
This assumption is meant to increase the chances that the Sender has incentives to truthfully signal his type at the signaling stage (stage 1.) and thus goes against the paper's main findings (Malaith, 1987) . An example of signaling cost function satisfying strict increasing differences is
For the Sender, a signaling strategy takes the form of a mapping from his type to some real positive value s S : [k S , k S ] → R + . Following the usual definition, a strategy is separating if for all
A conflict strategy is a mapping from R's offer and S's type to a conflict decision f S : [a, a] × K S → {0, 1}. For the Receiver R, his strategy is a mapping from the sender's signal to an offer a R : R + → [a, a]. Throughout, I use the subscript * to denote equilibrium actions.
Analysis
I study whether signaling can resolve informational asymmetries at the source of wasteful conflicts.
To do so, I focus on the most interesting cases for which conflicts would be avoided, should information asymmetries be eliminated.
Formally, denote a c R (k S ) the Receiver's offer which leaves the Sender indifferent between starting a conflict (f S = 1) or peace (f S = 0). I label a c R (k S ) the compromise offer and assume it is unique in the text (the Online Appendix deals with the general case). I assume that the Sender's potential cost of conflicts are such that compromise is always necessary and possible: a ≤ a c R (k S ) ≤ a for all k S ∈ K S . 1 Further, I assume that if the Receiver learns the Sender's type, he is willing to 1 Note that if a > a c R (k S ) for some k S ∈ K S , then conflict is unavoidable for some types. In turn, if a c R (k S ) > a, some types never start a conflict. The two restrictions are with little loss of generality since we can always focus on the subset of types for which they hold.
compromise: r(a c R (k S )) ≥ E L r(z)|a R = a − k R for all k S ∈ K S (where the left-hand side is the payoff from compromise and the right-hand side the highest possible expected payoff from a conflict with expectation over lottery outcomes). Finally, absent any information at the signaling stage, I suppose that there is a risk of conflict: a p R = arg max a R ∈[a,a] E U S (a R ; f S )|k S ∈ K S (with expectation over Sender's type and lottery outcomes) satisfies a p R > a c R (k S ) for some k S ∈ K S . I first consider fixed-outcome lottery. The first proposition states that signaling never reduces by any amount the informational asymmetry.
Proposition 1. For all fixed-outcome lotteries and all type-space K S , in any equilibrium, the Sender plays a pooling strategy: s * S (k S ) = s p S for all k S ∈ K S .
Proof. All proofs are collected in the Online Appendix
To understand this result, recall that, under the assumptions, after learning that the Sender's cost is k S , the Receiver chooses the compromise offer a c R (k S ), which leaves the Sender indifferent between conflict and peace. Since conflict is a fixed-outcome lottery, a c
For a separating equilibrium to exist, it must be that (i) a Sender with cost k h S does not want to imitate a Sender with cost k l S and (ii) a type-k l S is willing to differentiate himself from a type-k h S . When a high-cost Sender (k h S ) imitates a low-cost Sender (k l S ), he obtains a better compromise offer and a strictly positive benefit from imitation v(a c R (k l S )) − v(a c R (k h S )). Thus, to discourage imitation by a high-cost, it must be that mimicking a low cost is costly: s S (k l S ) > s S (k h S ). In turn, if a low-cost pretends to be a high-cost, the Receiver offers a c R (k h S ) > a c R (k l S ) and the Sender starts a conflict. His expected payoff is then E L v(z) − k l S , the exact same payoff as from revealing his type. A low-cost Sender's benefit from differentiation is thus null and he is never willing to pay a signaling cost to reveal his type. Consequently, we can never satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) simultaneously. The result extends to all possible equilibria with information transmission at the signaling stage since I can always find two types such that the reasoning above applies.
As noted in the introduction, many different forms of conflict can be understood as fixedoutcome lotteries: trials, strikes, and especially wars. In all these cases, Proposition 1 indicates that there is no decentralized mechanism which permits information transmission. This result may provide a rationale for why armed conflict actually break out. One of the criticism of bargaining models of war is that as we get closer to the onset of war, uncertainty should be resolved. Proposition 1 shows that this need not be the case. Any action by a belligerent prior to his opponent's final offer has no informative content. Only the beginning or not of military actions is informative about an interested party's type (one-important-limitation to the whole analogy is that the unique pooling equilibrium features no type engaging in costly signaling: s * S (k S ) = 0 for all k S ∈ K S ).
I now turn to offer-dependent lottery. First, I consider whether conflict can always be avoided, that is, whether a separating equilibrium exists. Unlike fixed-outcome lotteries, the answer is positive, though under specific conditions. In particular, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the type-space is discrete.
Proposition 2. Denote K the cardinality of K S . For all offer-dependent lotteries, a separating equilibrium exists if and only if
To understand this result, consider again he strategy of two types k l S , k h S ∈ K 2 S , k l S < k h S . As above, a separating equilibrium exists only if a type-k h S does not want to imitate a type-k l S and a type-k l S is willing to distinguish himself from its higher cost counterpart. For a high-cost Sender, the benefit of imitation is still the gain from a more favorable compromise offer:
). In turn, if the low-cost Sender pretends to be a type k h S , it starts a conflict after the Receiver offers the compromise a c R (k h S ). This means that a low-cost Sender's benefit from
. Observe that since conflict is an offer-dependent lottery, a low-cost Sender's benefit from differentiation is no longer null. Nonetheless, due to the possibility of starting a conflict, it is strictly lower than a high-cost Sender's benefit from imitation. The signaling cost to guarantee separation must thus be sufficiently large to encourage a type-k h S Sender not to imitate a lower cost, but also sufficiently small to guarantee that a type-k − S l Sender reveals his type. When the Senders' possible costs of conflict are very close (e.g., K S contains an interval), there never exists a signaling strategy s S which satisfies both conditions. Hence, a separating equilibrium can only exist if the Sender's possible costs take discrete values. In addition, Condition 3 also needs to be satisfied. This condition imposes additional restrictions on the distance between the Sender's possible costs. To better interpret Condition 3, the next example provides a useful illustration.
Under the assumptions, a separating equilibrium guarantees no conflict. Can we obtain a similar outcome when we allow for coarser information transmission at the signaling stage (i.e.,
the Sender plays a semi-separating strategy)? As the next proposition shows, in addition to an amended Condition 3, conflict is avoided in a semi-separating equilibrium only if the Receiver is, in some sense, conflict-adverse and compromises with all types playing the same signaling strategy.
Before stating formally the result, it is useful to introduce the following notation. For all K m S ⊆ K S , denote k m S := min K m S .
Proposition 3. For all offer-dependent lottery, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium with no conflict if and only if there exists a partition of the type space
Condition 1 in Proposition 3 documents that in any semi-separating equilibrium, partition sets are ordered. Condition 2 establishes a simple condition so that a high-cost Sender does not imitate a Sender with a lower cost. More interestingly, Condition 3 highlights the difficulty to sustain a semi-separating equilibrium (an appropriately modified Condition 3 applies to all semi-separating equilibria). A Sender's incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied not just for the extrema in the partition sets of the type space, but also for almost all interior costs (i.e., for all k S ∈ K m S , m ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1}) . This result boils down again to the shadow of conflict. As in traditional signaling games, the cost of differentiation-i.e., signaling cost-is increasing with a Sender's cost
is increasing in k S by the increasing differences assumption.
In addition, unlike traditional signaling games, in this set-up, the benefit from differentiation is also strictly increasing in the Sender's cost of conflict k S since a relatively low-cost Sender starts a conflict when it mimics a relatively high type (i.e., send signal s m+1
decreases with k S . The combination of these two effects imply that it is a priori unclear which type in the set K m S has the greatest incentive to imitate a relatively high-cost Sender. Finally, Condition 4 stresses that a no-conflict semi-separating equilibrium requires strong assumption on the Receiver's utility function. There must exist a partition which satisfies Conditions 1-3 and induces full compromise on the Receiver's part. Overall, Proposition 3 suggests that only separating equilibria (when they exist) can be expected to bring peace.
Conclusion
This paper establishes that signaling is unlikely to resolve one of the main sources of conflict: informational asymmetries. A separating equilibrium exists only under restrictive conditions including: (i) the outcome of the conflict must depend on the Receiver's previous offer and (ii) the Sender's privately known cost of conflict must take discrete values. Conditions for existence of a semi-separating equilibrium are no less stringent and such equilibria are unlikely to guarantee no conflict on path. I further establish a strong negative result. If the outcomes of conflict are independent of previous actions, no information is ever revealed in equilibrium for all possible form of uncertainty and payoffs. This suggest that in various settings, such as war or plea bargaining, no decentralized mechanism permits any form of information transmission between interested parties.
In Online Appendix B and C, I explore the robustness of this striking result. I show that the impossibility to transmit any information with signaling remains when the Sender has better information about his winning probabilities rather than his cost of conflict (Proposition B.1). A similar negative conclusion holds when both the Sender and Receiver face a positive recognition probability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (Proposition C.1). Some information can be transmitted, however, if we allow for a bargained solution between the Sender and Receiver, though much depends on the Sender's bargaining power (Propositions C.2 and C.3). This last finding provides an interesting counterpoint to Banks (1990) . In his seminal contribution, Banks establishes general properties of bargained outcomes in the shadow of wars for all possible bargaining protocols. My results highlight that no such general property exists when it comes to information transmission.
A Proofs
the set of actions which leave a type-k S Sender indifferent between conflict (f S = 1) and no conflict (f S = 0). Further, define
the set of offers which maximize the Sender's expected utility when no information is transmitted at the signaling stage. I formalise the assumptions in the main text as:
Assumption 1 guarantees that there always exists a Receiver's action a R that the Sender prefers to a conflict. Assumption 2 implies that the Receiver can (almost) never offer the highest action and avoids a conflict. Assumption 3 guarantees that the Receiver is willing to compromise after learning the Sender's cost of conflict. These three assumptions are necessary for a separating equilibrium to exist at least when the type-space is an interval (see Lemma A.1). Finally, Assumption 4 implies that informational asymmetries are a source of conflict. These assumptions guarantee that I focus on cases when signaling plays an important role to avoid a conflict. As explained in the main text, these assumptions are with little loss of generality since I can always redefine the type space so they hold.
and Assumption 1, 2, or 3 does not hold, then there is no equilibrium in which the Sender plays a separating strategy.
Before proving the result, I prove two preliminary claims.
Claim 1. In a separating equilibrium, after signal s * S (k S ), the Receiver's best response a *
Proof. To see that, observe first that if −E L v(z)|a R = a − k S ≤ −v(a), the Sender does not start a conflict when the Receiver chooses her preferred action. The Receiver's best response is then a * R (s * S (k 1 S )) = a. Assume now that −E L v(z)|a R = a −k S < −v(a) and A c (k S ) is non-empty. We now show that any
; k S ) = 0 and so provides a higher payoff than a R .
(strictly if the lottery is offer-dependent) so that offer a dominates a R (strictly if the lottery is offerdependent). In a fixed-outcome lottery, the Receiver may be indifferent between a R / ∈ A c (k S ) ∪ {a} so that f S (a R ; k S ) = 1 and a. However, it is without loss of generality to impose a * R (s * S (k S )) = a. Suppose now that A c (k S ) is empty. This means that the Receiver cannot avoid a challenge with the Sender. By the reasoning above, her best response is then a * R (s * S (k S )) = a.
Claim 2. In a separating equilibrium, the Receiver's best response a * R (s * S (k S )) must be such that
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction.
First, suppose that a * R (s * S (k l S )) ∈ A c (k l S ) and a * R (s * S (k h S )) ∈ A c (k h S ), with a * R (s * S (k l S )) > a * R (s * S (k h S )) (this is possible since the set A p (k S ) may not be a singleton). 2 A type-k 1 S and a type-k h S Sender's incentive compatibility (IC) constraints must then satisfy respectively:
By definitions of A c (k S ), a type-k l S Sender engages in a challenge when he mimics a type-k h S ; that
))). A necessary conditions for the two (IC)
2 If a * R (s * S (k l S )) = a * R (s * S (k h S )), then it can be checked that both types should send the same signal, contradicting the equilibrium is separating.
constraints to simulatenously hold is then:
, which is impossible by the increasing differences assumption.
Second, suppose that a * R (s * S (k l S )) = a and a * R (s * S (k h S )) ∈ A c (k h S ). The (IC) constraints of respectively a type-k l S and a type-k h S senders are, respectively:
Using the definition of A c (k S ), the second inequality is equivalent to:
, which is impossible by the increasing differences assumption. Finally, suppose a * R (s * S (k ′ S )) = a = a * R (s * S (k ′′ S )). The equilibrium then cannot be separating since both types send the same signal.
Proof of Lemma A.1
If Assumption 1 does not hold, then there exists k f S > k S such that in any equilibrium, for all k S ∈ [k S , k f S ) and a R ∈ [a, a], f * S (a R ; k S ) = 1. As a result, the Receiver's best response to s *
= a leading to a contradiction by Claim 2.
Finally, suppose Assumption 3 is violated. First note that the strategy profile a R (s * S (k S )) = a and a R (s * S (k S )) < a for all k S < k S and k S ∈ K S cannot be an equilibrium strategy profile if Assumption 2 holds. Indeed, if the Receiver prefers to generate a conflict after learning the Sender's type is k S , she also prefers to generate a conflict for k S < k S since she then must offer a lower offer a R to avoid a challenge. So if there is a positive ex-ante probability of conflict on the equilibrium path, it must be that for some k S ∈ int(K S ), a * R (s * S (k S )) = a. But this violates Claim 2.
Corollary 1. If Assumptions 1-3 hold, in a separating equilibrium, the Receiver's best response is
Proof. Given Assumption 3, if A c (k S ) is not empty, then a * R (s * S (k S )) ∈ A c (k S ). By Assumption 1 and 2, A c (k S ) is not empty. The Receiver then obviously chooses the highest possible offer in
In what follows, I use the shorthand a c R (k S ) := max A c (k S ) to denote the Receiver's best-response after signal s * S (k S )-a * R (s * S (k S ))-in a separating equilibrium. Recall that I label a c R (k S ) the compromise offer.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, I prove that the Sender never plays a separating strategy in equilibrium. Second, I establish that there never exists a semi-separating equilibrium. Finally, 3 Note that if the conflict is a fixed-outcome lottery, all types k S ∈ [k S , k f S ) gets the same expected payoff for all a R ∈ [a, a] and no separation is possible.
I show that there does not exist any mixed strategy equilibrium.
Step 1. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose first that there exists a separating equilibrium and denote a type-k S Sender's signal s * S (k S ) for all k S ∈ K S and all possible type-space K S . Consider two types k l S , k h S ∈ K 2 S with k l S < k h S . The (IC) constraint of a type-k h S Sender relative to a type k l S is:
Since a c R (k h S ) > a c R (k l S ), it is necessary that s * S (k ′′ S ) > s * S (k ′ S ) to satisfy the high type's (IC) constraint.
Consider now the (IC) constraint of a type-k l S relative to a type-k h S .
−
Observe that since a c R (k l S ) < a c R (k h S ) (Claim 2 and Corollary 1), when a type-k l S mimics a type-k h S Sender by sending signal s * S (k h S ), he starts a conflict after the Receiver offers a c R (k h S ) and obtains −E L v(z) −k l S since the conflict is a fixed-outcome lottery. By definition of a c R (k l S ), −v(a c R (k l S )) = −E L v(z) − k l S . Hence, we can rewrite Equation 5 as:
It is thus necessary that s * S (k h S ) ≤ s * S (k l S ) to satisfy the low-type's (IC) constraint. Both (IC) constraints cannot be satisfied simultaneously and a separating equilibrium does not exist.
Step 2. Consider the following semi-separating assessment in which there exists a partition of the
is the set of subsets K m S such that the Receiver compromises with some of the types in K m S . Using the same reasoning as in step 1, it can be checked that if a semi-separating assessment is an equilib-rium, the cardinality of K c S is 1 (using the types {k S } such that a * R (s m S ) = a c R (k S )). Hence, in any semi-separating equilibrium, M = 2 and a * R (s m S ) = a for m ∈ {1, 2}. However, by Assumption 3, for any m ∈ {1, 2}, r(a c R (min K m S )) ≥ E L r(z)|a R = a − k R = E L r(z)|a R = a c R (max K m S ) − k R (using the fixed-outcome property of the lottery L). Hence, a * R (s m S ) < a c R (max K m S ) for all m ∈ {1, 2} which implies cardK c S > 1, a contradiction.
Step 3.For a mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, the Sender must be indifferent between two signals. Hence, there must exist a partition of the type space with cardinality greater than 1. But we have seen that this is impossible by step 2.
Combining the three steps, the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. 4
In what follows, I consider offer-dependent lottery. −
by a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1 (note, however, that the outcome of the lottery now depends on the Receiver's offer a R ).
Observe that −v(a c R (k l S )) > −v(a c R (k h S )) (Corollary 1) so to satisfy Equation 4, it is necessary that s * S (k l S ) > s * S (k h S ). Further, by definition of a c R (k l S ), lim
Using Equation 4 and Equation 6
, it can then be checked that if s S (k S ) is not continuous, there exists a profitable deviation for types close enough to the discontinuity.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in three steps. I first prove that Condition 1 is necessary. Second, I show that Condition 2 is necessary. I finally prove sufficiency.
Step 1. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose K S is not discrete and a separating equilibrium exists with a type-k S Sender's signal denoted s * S (k S 
we can rewrite the (IC) constraints as:
Rearranging and using the definitions of k l S and k h S , I obtain: 
Both inequalities clearly cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and I have thus reached a contradiction.
Step 2. Suppose that K S := {k 1 S , . . . , k K S }. Using Equation 6 with k l S = k j S and k h S = k j+1 S yields the following (IC) constraint of a type-k j S relative to a type-k j+1 S for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}:
In turn, Equation 4 yields the following (IC) constraint of a type-k j+1 S relative to a type-k j S :
The only choice variable in Equation 9 and Equation 10 is the signaling strategy: s * S = (s * S (k 1 S ), . . . , s * S (k K S )). Hence, it is necessary that there exist signals s * S (k j S ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K} satisfying Equation 3 as claimed.
Step 3. I now show sufficiency. First, I show that if the local (IC) constraint (i.e., type-k j S and type-k j+1 S 's incentives to deviate) holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}, then all other (IC) constraints are satisfied.
First, I show that if Equation 9 holds for all
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K − j}. To see this, suppose j < K − 1 and m = 2:
The inequality comes from the assumption that Equation 9 holds for all j. By a similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma A.2, in a separating equilibrium s * S (k j S ) > s * S (k j+1 S ) for all j. Using the assumption that C(·, ·) exhibits strict increasing differences, we thus have:
I can then use the same reasoning for m > 2 to prove the claim.
Finally, I show that if Equation 10 holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} then
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K − j}. To see this, suppose again j < K − 1 and m = 2:
Using again the strict increasing difference properties of C(·, ·), I obtain:
Second, I show that a separating equilibrium exists if there exists a vector of signals such that Equation 3 holds. Consider the following assessment:
• For all j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, a type-k j S Sender sends signal s S (k j S ) with s S (k K S ) = s S (k S ) = 0;
• s S = {s S (k 1 S ), . . . , s S (k K S )} is such that Equation 3 holds;
• Upon observing s S (k j S ) for all j, the Receiver's belief is that the Sender's type is k j S with probability 1 and her strategy is a R (s S (k j S )) = a c R (k j S ); Upon observing s S / ∈ s S , the Receiver's out-of-equilibrium is that the Sender's type is k S with probability 1 and her strategy is then a R ( s S ) = a c R (k S );
• For all j, a type-k j S Sender chooses f S = 0 if and only if a R ≤ a c R (k j S ) and f S = 1 otherwise. the Sender's conflict strategy is a best response to any Receiver's offer a R . 5 Hence, the assessment described above is a PBE.
Details for Example 1
Under the parametrization, the compromise offer for a type-k j S satisfies:
Plugging the value of v(a c R (k j S )) into Condition 3, I obtain that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium is for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}:
This is equivalent to:
Hence, we can always find signaling values s * S such that a separating equilibrium exists if and only if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}: 
as both start a conflict (or k m+1 S is indifferent) after signals s m S and signals s m+1 S . The two (IC)
). But this last condition violates the strict increasing differences assumption, a contradiction.
Condition 2. Observe that by the assumption of strict increasing difference
Condition 3. By the now usual reasoning, the upward (IC) constraint of a type k S ∈ K m S is for all m ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1} is (see the proof of Proposition 2):
. To see that it is not enough that the (IC) constraint is satisfied by the extrema of set K m S , suppose that K S is continuous L =< {0, a R }, {p, 1 − p} > and C(s, k S ) = s × g(k S ) with g ′ (·) > 0. It can be checked then that s m S − s m+1 Condition 4. If the condition does not hold, then it must be that there exists m such that if k S = k m S , the Sender's best response is to start a conflict after signal s m S and offer a ss R (s m S ). Hence, conflict occurs on the equilibrium path.
B Uncertainty about winning probabilities
In this variation of the baseline model, I suppose that the Sender's cost of conflict is common knowledge and denoted k S . In turn, I suppose that the Sender has better information about the probability that he wins the conflict. Formally, there exist a set Λ ⊆ [λ, λ], λ, λ ∈ Λ 2 such that the probability of outcome z j occurs is p j (λ), j ∈ {1, . . . , N } for all λ ∈ Λ. The lottery now takes Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which there exists λ l , λ h ∈ Λ 2 with λ l < λ h such that s * S (λ l ) = s * S (λ h ). Assume without loss of generality that a * R (s * S (λ l )) = a c R (λ l ) and a * R (s * S (λ h )) = a c R (λ h ) (such types must exist since the Receiver, otherwise, can increase her offer without increasing the probability of conflict, a profitable deviation). A type-λ l is willing to play signaling strategy s * S (λ l ) only if:
The first line comes from the fact that a type-λ l starts a conflict when the Receiver proposes a c R (λ h ) after signal s * S (λ h ). The second line comes from the definition of a c R (λ l ). In turn, a type-λ h is willing to play signaling strategy s * S (λ h ) only if:
Since a c R (λ l ) < a c R (λ h ), the two inequalities cannot be satisfied simultaneously, a contradiction.
C Different bargaining protocols
In this section, I assume as in the baseline model that the Receiver is uncertain about the cost of conflict k S ∈ K S . Assumptions 1-4 of the baseline model hold in this Appendix. I further impose that if the Sender were to make an offer, he would need to compromise as well: r(a) < E L (r(z)|a R = a) − k R . I move away from tradition signaling games and consider two different bargaining protocols in turn: 1) the Sender has a positive probability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer and 2) the offer is the result of some form of bargaining between the Receiver and Sender.
C.1 Different recognition probabilities
In this subsection, I assume that at the bargaining stage (stage 3 in the timing), there is a probability β ∈ (0, 1) (resp. 1 − β) that the Receiver (resp. Sender) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (i.e., the bargaining protocol is a form of Rubinstein model with interior probability of recognition and immediate breakdown into conflict upon offer rejection). If the offer is rejected, conflict ensues.
The baseline model corresponds to the case β = 1.
To account for the model amendment, I denote a 
. Assume without loss of generality that a * B (R; s * S (k l S )) = a c B (R; k l S ) and a * B (R; s * S (k h S )) = a c B (R; k h S ) (such types must exist since the Receiver, otherwise, can increase her offer without increasing the probability of conflict, a profitable deviation). A type-k l S is willing to play signaling strategy s * S (k l S ) only if:
The first line comes from the fact that a type-k l S starts a conflict when the Receiver proposes a c B (R; k h S ) after signal s * S (k h S ). The second line comes from a c B (R; k l S ) = a c R (k l S ). In turn, a type-k h S is willing to play signaling strategy s * S (k h S ) only if:
By the usual reasoning, the two inequalities cannot be satisfied simultaneously, a contradiction.
C.2 Bargained compromise offer
In this subsection, I exogenously assume that at the bargaining stage, the offer is some action strictly between R's preferred offer (conditional on his information) and S's preferred offer. I leave the protocol which leads to this offer unmodeled.
Using the notation a B (J; ·), denote a max B (R; s S ) = arg max a∈ [a,a] Proof. First, observe that the Receiver always chooses no conflict so we can focus on the Sender.
Suppose now the condition holds. This implies that for any two costs of conflict k l S and k h S > k l S in K S , the bargained offer satisfies: a s B (k h S ) ≤ a c B (R; k l S ). Hence a type-k l S Sender's best response in stage 3 when he imitates a type-k h S is f S (a s B (k h S ); k l S ) = 0. In this case, a type-k l S 's (IC) constraint is:
In turn, by the usual reasoning, a type-k h S 's (IC) constraint is:
Using the increasing differences assumption, it can be checked that we can always find a signaling function s S (k S ) which satisfies both (IC) constraints. Using a similar reasoning as Proposition 2, I can then construct a separating equilibrium. 
Before proving the proposition, notice that Equation 11 takes a similar form as Equation 3 (or Condition 3 of Proposition 3). The presence of a bargained offer generates a benefit from differentiation, which is absent when the Receiver makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. However, when a relatively low-cost Sender (k l S ∈ K b S ∩ K S ) is willing to start a conflict after imitating a relatively high-cost Sender (k h S ∈ K t S (k S ) ∩ K S ), this benefit is limited and is equal to v(a s B (k h S )) − k b S (k h S ) − v(a s B (k l S )) − k l S . In turn, the benefit from imitation for a relatively high-cost Sender is always large and equal to v(a s
Hence, the existence of a separating equilibrium is not always guaranteed when the shadow of conflict looms large (i.e., a s B (k S ) > a c B (R; k S )).
Proof. I start with necessity. Take two types k l S ∈ K b S ∩ K S and k h S ∈ K t S (k S ) ∩ K S (the two sets are not empty since k S , k S ∈ K 2 S ). A type-k l S 's (IC) constraint is then:
−v(a s B (k l S )) − C(s S (k l S ), k l S ) ≥ −E L (v(z)) − k l S − C(s S (k h S ), k l S )
The first line follows from a type-k l S Sender starting a conflict after pretending to be a type For sufficiency, observe that if k l S / ∈ K b S ∩ K S or k h S / ∈ K t S (k S ) ∩ K S , the (IC) constraints can be satisfied by increasing differences following a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition C.2. I can then use a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 to finish the proof.
